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We estimate the private school eﬀect on years of schooling attained. Single equation
models show no signiﬁcant eﬀect of private schooling, while selectivity correction renders
the estimate negative, but still insigniﬁcant. Results from estimations of diﬀerent private
school types reveal signiﬁcant positive and negative coeﬃcients in single equation models,
w h i c ha r er e d u c e da n dr e n d e r e di n s i g n i ﬁcant by IV estimation. Also, we show how our
extensive set of controls reduces omitted variables bias potentially present in studies with
more limited data sets that are typical for this literature. Including additional controls
eliminates the signiﬁcant positive OLS private school eﬀect from a more simple model.
21 Introduction
The focus of this anaysis is whether public and private schools have identical technologies
for producing human capital as measured by years of schooling. While there is ample
evidence on the eﬀect of private schooling on test scores, little research is conducted on
other educational outcomes, in spite of the greater importance of e.g. years of schooling
on labor market success and other outcomes (health, drug abuse, etc.). Also, even though
the structure and role of the private school sector diﬀer greatly across countries, previous
research is overwhelmingly concentrated on US data. The US literature focuses mainly
on Catholic private schools as they constitute a large, quite homogenous subgroup of the
private school market in the US.
The present paper extends the existing research on private school eﬀects by contribut-
ing with further evidence on the eﬀects of private schools on educational attainment and
by extending the research to a data set from a country with a private school system
quite diﬀerent from the US environment, because the Danish system is a virtually full
voucher system and is therefore an interesting case for the voucher debate in the US. As
the outcome variable, we use educational attainment measured as the number of years
of schooling attained by a student1. Also, we introduce a new instrument, inspired by
diﬀerences in the student body composition at local public schools, to control for selection
on unobservable characteristics.
We begin the empirical analysis by correcting for diﬀerences in observable character-
istics and we present evidence showing that the positive single equation coeﬃcient on the
private school eﬀect typically found in the literature might be driven by omitted vari-
ables bias. However, even with the extensive set of observed characteristics we employ,
the challenge remains of how to control for unmeasured variables that may be correlated
with both student behavior and the family’s choice of school sector. The bias can go in
either direction. If private schools attract students with higher (unobserved) ability or
students from families that place a higher value on education, then, single equation models
would overstate the eﬀect of private schooling. On the other hand, if private schools are
attractive for parents with children who have behavioral problems or for parents who do
not invest much time in their children’s education themselves (e.g. due to busy careers),
then, single equation models would understate the private school coeﬃcient. Therefore,
the appropriate model must account for potential selection on unobservable characteris-
tics. We use instrumental variables (IV) methods to directly control for the inﬂuence of
unmeasured variables. Additionally, as the Danish private school sector is quite diverse,
we provide results on each of nine diﬀerent private school types.
1We focus exclusively on educational attainment as the measure of school quality due to the unavail-
ability of data on test scores or wages in our data set.
3For estimation, we use data from Danish administrative registers. Private compulsory
schooling (i.e. schools combining primary and lower secondary school) is heavily subsi-
dized in Denmark, but there is no formal mechanism for disseminating information about
schools’ methods, programs, or academic results. There has been — and still is — a high
degree of reluctance against a more formal evaluation in the education sector in Denmark.
However, comparison of school performance has become more popular recently as can be
seen by the seriousness with which the Danish public and politicians reacted on the not
so favorable national results from the OECD PISA 2000 study (Program for International
Student Assessment), and by the fact that — as a reaction to these ﬁndings — mean test
scores for each school for the ﬁrst time ever were published on the Ministry of Education’s
web-site. In the past, several examples of inferior private schools have become known and
only recently, some Arabic private schools have become the focus of negative public atten-
tion2. On the other hand, results from a study conducted for a major Danish newspaper
suggest that private schools as a whole are superior to public schools3. The present study
tries to give some answers to these conﬂicting results.
In the economic literature, there is substantial controversy regarding private school
eﬀects on academic outcomes. Earlier studies by Coleman et al. (1982), Coleman and
Hoﬀer (1987), and Greeley (1982) have indicated that private schools have positive eﬀects.
Critics claim that seemingly positive private school eﬀects could be the result of selection
rather than causation. Therefore, in the recent literature, school choice is treated as an
endogenous determinant of educational outcomes (e.g., Evans and Schwab 1995; Sander
and Krautmann 1995; Sander 1996, 1999, 2000; Dee 1998; Neal 1997; Figlio and Stone
1999). Results of the eﬀorts to measure private school quality are mixed. The available
evidence seems to suggest that private schools may on average produce slightly better
educational outcomes than public schools — particularly for students with only low-quality
public alternatives and students least likely to choose private school (Neal 1997; Figlio and
Stone 1999; Evans and Schwab 1995; Sander 1996). Only a few papers use educational
attainment as indicator of school quality, e.g. Sander and Krautmann 1995; Neal 1997;
Evans and Schwab 1995. The existing literature is dominated by studies on US data.
The present study extends the discussion to the Danish, and — more broadly — Northern
European, context. This is a useful extention to the literature, as both the institutional
set up of the private school sector, and the role of private schools, diﬀer across countries.
For example, in the United States, there is no public funding of private schools, while
Danish private schools receive 75% of their operating costs as a state-subsidy. Also,
2The public ﬁnancial support of two Arabic schools has even been taken away due to bad performance.
3Published in Jyllandsposten København (May, 27th/ 31st and June, 1st 2001) that reports that private
school students are superior with respect to both educational attainment and wage, even after controlling
for the parents’ social status. However, this study uses only few control variables and the estimates are
not corrected for selection bias.
4the role of the private school sector might diﬀer between countries with a public sector
that streams students by ability like the United States4, compared to countries, like the
Northern European countries, that have a fully comprehensive compulsory school system.
Our results indicate that after controlling for observable characteristics, the private
school eﬀect, while being positive, is close to zero and not signiﬁcant. This is at odds
with a major part of the existing literature on private school eﬀects, which generally
ﬁnds a positive private school eﬀect in simple models that do not adjust for selection on
unobservable characteristics. We then provide evidence that the positive private school
eﬀects found in single equation models in other studies, are probably driven by omitted
variables bias. When we imitate the limited set of control variables common in other
studies, we ﬁnd a positive private school impact on educational attainment, too. The use
of instrument variables techniques in the next step of our analysis reverses the positive
sign of our private school estimate, but the estimate is still small and not signiﬁcant.
As an additional step, we show that when the quite diverse private school sector is
divided into several homogenous groups, in single equation models, we get the whole
range of possible outcomes: the estimates for some private school types are positive and
signiﬁcant, while others are not statistically diﬀerent from zero or are even negative and
signiﬁcant. However, after adjusting for self-selection into private school types by IV
estimation, the point estimates are reduced and insigniﬁcant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline
the institutional set-up of the Danish private school sector. The third section discusses
the data, and the sections 4 and 5 present uncorrected and corrected models and results.
Concluding remarks follow.
2 The Danish private school sector
An important feature of the Danish educational system is the access to a school of the
parents’ own choice: if the schools oﬀered by the public education system are not to
your liking, you can attend a private school. Educational choice is achieved through a
system of public vouchers for private schooling. About 85% of the average municipal
spending5 on a public school students follows students who enroll in private schools. The
Ministry of Education pays a sum per pupil to each private school. The exact amount
varies depending upon the size of the school, the age distribution of the students, and the
seniority of the teachers. The variation ranges from about 4000 EURO to 8000 EURO
4However, there has been a wave of detracking public schools in the US in the recent decades.
5There is a ﬁxed state subsidy of 75% of the average public school expenditures and, on average, local
authorities subsidize private schools with another 10%.
5(Ministry of Education 2000). This policy helps to compensate for the smaller schools’
higher than average costs and it means that private schools can aﬀord to open and sustain
themselves in smaller towns and rural areas. In order to establish a school and receive
public vouchers, a parent or teacher must only gather a few students (a total of at least
28 pupils in the 1st to 7th grade) and establish a board of governors. In that way, families
throughout the country are assured of access to free schools.
Also, this policy allows Danish private schools to charge low tuition fees. The average
compulsory school charges about 1000 EURO per year. Parental commitment to and
involvement with private schools are viewed as a corner stone of their success. The Danish
policy requires that private schools charge some minimum tuition fees, albeit very low
fees (500 Euro per year), in order to ensure that parents have a ﬁnancial stake in the
school they choose for their children and thus a high degree of commitment to the school.
Additionally, as a means of assuring direct parental control of private schools, each one
”must be governed by a board elected by parents”. Private compulsory schools (including
primary and lower secondary levels) are completely autonomous as long as they teach the
basic subjects of Danish, arithmetic, mathematics and English6. Government legislation
for private schools contains detailed rules about government ﬁnancial support, but only
the most general rules about the educational contents. There are, for example, almost
no rules about the Ministry of Education’s control of the educational performance of the
schools. All that is demanded of private education is that it "measures up" to that of
public schools. In extraordinary circumstances, the Ministry of Education may establish
special supervision, for example if there is reason to believe that, e.g. an immigrant school
teaches Danish so poorly that the students’ ability to cope with life in Denmark may be
adversely aﬀected. This policy has produced a broad array of private schools. An OECD
report states that, ”the laissez-faire approach to private schools in Denmark produces a
diversity unparalleled in other OECD countries” (OECD 1994:146). The private school
sector includes independent rural schools, academically-oriented lower secondary schools,
some religious schools, progressive free schools, Rudolf Steiner [i.e., Waldorf] schools,
German minority schools and immigrant schools such as Muslim schools. In Denmark,
attendance of a private school is not generally considered elitist. Private school pupils
have no added status or advantages to aﬀord them a smoother passage through upper
secondary and tertiary education and beyond. Schools are free to determine their own
student enrolment: they may select students on whatever grounds they choose. About 11%
of all students attend private schools — the trend has been increasing since the beginning
of the 1980s, but has now stabilized.
6However, they must pay teachers the same as municipal schools.
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The data on student characteristics and outcomes come from Danish administrative regis-
ters. The data set used in the analyses contains data on almost 54,000 young people born
between 1965 and 1973. The data set combines individual level data (a panel 10% random
sample of the population) from administrative registers for the young people themselves
and their families with data for socioeconomic conditions at the municipal level7.O u r
analysis focuses on years of education as an outcome from schooling. We have data on
the highest educational degree attained. Most of the coding is straightforward: 7th,8 th
and 9th grade are coded to 7, 8, and 9 years of schooling. However, the 10th grade was
coded to 9 years of schooling only, because in Denmark, the 10th grade is voluntary and
is not regarded as a full year of education, but rather as an additional year for students
not ready yet to continue through the educational system8. Further, a vocational degree
is coded to 11 years, a high school degree to 12 years, short college to 14 years, a bachelor
degree to 15 years, a master degree to 17 years and a Ph.D. to 20 years of education. The
distribution of years of schooling by school type can be seen from Figure 1. As can be seen,
the number of students dropping out of school before the end of compulsory education (9
years) is almost zero. Overall, higher academic degrees are more prevalent among private
school students.
[Figure 1 about here]
We adopt a set of variables for inclusion as controls that is roughly comparable to the
sets used in other recent studies, although more comprehensive. Descriptive statistics for
selected control variables (together with the signiﬁcance levels from a t-test for identical
means for the private and public students sample) are presented in Table 1. Three sets of
explanatory variables are considered:
7The data employed in this study are drawn from a data set originally collected for the analysis of
Graversen and Heinesen (2000) on the eﬀect of school resources on educational attainment in Danish
public schools. In addition to the data set used by Graversen and Heinesen, we include data on private
school students as well.
8The factsheet on the "Folkeskole" from the Ministry of Education informs: "The 10th form constitutes
an oﬀer to that group of pupils who, on completion of the 9th form, have not yet come to a decision on
their choice of education. This school year is thus to be seen as a supplement at the time of transition
from basic school to upper secondary education, and the oﬀer is in particular meant for pupils who need to
strengthen their subject-speciﬁc or personal competencies in order to acquire more conﬁdence with regard
to their choice and ability to complete a course of education at upper secondary level. The school year is
made up of obligatory lessons in Danish, mathematics and English corresponding to half of the teaching
time and a number of other subjects which the pupil chooses on the basis of his or her education plan. The
pupil is furthermore oﬀered to take part in bridge-building to upper secondary education. The teaching
takes place at the individual Folkeskole or in special 10th form-centres which bring together the 10th forms
of a local area." (http://eng.uvm.dk//publications/factsheets/fact2.htm)
71. Personal characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity)
2. Family background (parents’ education, income, wealth, labor market status and un-
employment, number of (younger) siblings, family structure and housing conditions
(all measures taken at the student’s age 15), teenage parents)
3. Socioeconomic conditions in the municipality (general level of education and unem-
ployment and the share of bilingual students in the municipality at the student’s
age 15)
[Table 1 about here]
Most of the variables require little explanation. Yet, we include some variables that
are not commonly used in the literature. The sibling-variables are included because in
existing research on this topic being an only child or being the ﬁrst-born child is typically
associated with a higher educational attainment. A possible explanation is that adult
stimulation is important for the child’s intellectual development, and the more siblings
a child has, the less parental time per child is available. The ﬁrst-born child receives
most adult stimulation, because it is the only child till the next child is born. Another
explanation is that for a ﬁxed family income, the economic conditions in the family are
better, the smaller the family. Children from large families will thus possibly receive
less investment in their human capital, both due to time- and ﬁnancial restrictions (e.g.
Ermisch and Francesconi, 1997). There are two variables for siblings: the number of
siblings and a dummy variable for whether the student has younger siblings, because we
cannot see in the data, whether the student is the ﬁrst-born child. We use the dummy
instead: if there are younger siblings, chances that the student is the ﬁrst-born child are
greater.
Data on parents’ education is missing in a signiﬁcant number of cases (for almost
6000 students). We suspect that these values are missing in a non-random sample of the
population. For example, years of schooling among students where the parents’ education
is missing are 1.1 years lower than the number for students, where the education variable
is available. 10% of all public schools students have missing values on parental education,
while this is the case for only 8% of private school students. Observations with missing
data on parental education have been dropped.
In the estimations, we also include interaction terms for a parent’s income, wealth
and unemployment, and whether the child lives with the respective parent as controls.
These interactions capture the eﬀect that the income, wealth and unemployment of the
parent, the child lives with might be more important than that of an absent parent. The
8expected sign for the interaction coeﬃcients in the estimation is the reverse of the sign
for the parent’s income, wealth and unemployment.
Housing conditions are an additional indicator of the social and economic conditions
during childhood and thus potentially relevant for school choice and educational outcome.
There are three types of variables: whether the dwelling is owned or rented, how many
rooms per person there are, and whether the dwelling is situated in a socially deprived
neighborhood. We include the number of rooms per person in the household, because the
more rooms available, the greater is the probability that the student has a room of his/her
own and thus is ensured a peaceful learning environment at home.
We classify students as public or private school students based on the school they
attend in the 8th grade. We exclude 11 out of 275 municipalities for which there are
no observations for private school students in our dataset. These are typically rural
municipalities, partly small islands. They are excluded from the analysis because private
school attendance might not be a feasible alternative in these municipalities.
Over the period covered by our data, private school attendance for primary and lower
secondary students has boomed. While only 5.9% of the student generation of 1965 has
attended private school, this number has risen to 10.8% for students born in 1973. The
increase has mainly taken place in urban municipalities. While private school attendance
has increased from 5.4% to 7.9% in rural areas, it has more than doubled in urban areas
(from 6.2% to 12.7%).
Table 1 shows that private school students on average attain approximately 0.4 more
years of schooling than public school students. The table also indicates that the charac-
teristics of private school students suggest that they were more likely to succeed in school.
Apart from having more educated parents, private school students have fewer brothers and
sisters, which means that there is more parental time available per child. Also, private
school students are less often born to teen parents, their parents have a higher income
and wealth, are less unemployed and they live in homes with more rooms per person,
making it more likely that the student has a room of his own. Moreover, private school
students tend less often to live in socially deprived areas, the average level of education
among residents in the municipality is higher, but they also live in municipalities with
more bilingual children. As the table also indicates, fewer private school students live
with both natural parents at age 15 (75% and 80%).
The central question in this paper is whether private schools still have an important
impact on years of schooling once we control for the eﬀects of these measured diﬀerences
a c r o s ss t u d e n t sa sw e l la sa n yu n m e a s u r e dd i ﬀerences. In order to get an idea of the
underlying process of school choice and outcomes, we compare education outcomes across
broad demographic groups. In Table 2, years of schooling are computed by parental
9education, urbanicity, family income and gender, and the level of signiﬁcance from a t-test
for identical means in the public and private school samples are reported. The numbers
indicate that when we consider groups of students with the same parental education,
diﬀerences in outcomes between public and private schools are greatly reduced, and for
four out of six education groups the t-test is only signiﬁcant at the .05 level. The means
from the full sample are repeated in line 1 for comparison. Thus, at least part of the
private school eﬀect in the raw data of Table 1 is due to the fact that private school
students tend to come from higher educated families. Also, another interesting feature
is that the positive private school eﬀect is reversed for students from the two highest
parental education categories. This could be due to the fact that a greater share of
these parents live in areas with good public schools and that the comparison for these
groups is between private and high-quality public schools only, while also low quality
public schools enter the mean for the other education groups. Unlike parental education,
which generally greatly reduces diﬀerences in outcomes between public and private school
students, parental income cannot explain diﬀerence in outcomes. Table 2 also shows that
the diﬀerence in education attainment between school types is about the same in rural
and urban areas.
[Table 2 about here]
In the next section, we present results from single equation models.
4 Single equation models
Let the educational outcome of individual i in municipality j, Yij, depend on a vector
of individual-speciﬁc characteristics, Xij, a vector of municipality-speciﬁc characteristics,
Dj, as well as the type of school attended, Pij:
Yij = β0 + β1Xij + β2Dj + β3Pij + εij (1)
where εij is a random error with zero mean and variance σ2.
In all of our single equation models, we use the set of controls listed in table 1, year
of birth dummies and interaction terms between a parent’s income, wealth and unem-
ployment and whether the child lives with the respective parent. Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimates are reported in table 3. The results indicate that private school students
attain more schooling than public school students. However, the coeﬃcient is small and
highly insigniﬁcant. Attending private instead of public school implies only .02 more years
of schooling, which amounts to about a week of additional schooling.
10This zero private school eﬀect in a single equation model is at odds with most of
the existing literature on private school eﬀects. The majority of studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant
positive private school eﬀects of non-negligible size in models which do not adjust for bias
due to unobservable characteristics. In section 4.2, we provide evidence to explain why
our results deviate from other studies.
[Table 3 about here]
Overall, the other results in Table 3 are consistent with our expectations, for instance:
females, ﬁrst-born children, students living with both natural parents, students not born
to teen-parents, students with better educated parents, with parents with a higher labor
income, less unemployment, a wealthier father, whose parents are home-owners, live in a
dwelling with more rooms per person, do not live in a socially deprived area, live in a mu-
nicipality with fewer bilingual children, and more well-educated residents (neighborhood
eﬀects) all attain more years of schooling. Also, students with mothers who are in formal
education (at the child’s age 15), and with fathers who are self-employed do attain more
years of schooling9. However, not all results are as expected. e.g. the result that students
whose fathers are not in the workforce attain more schooling than those with fathers who
are employees.
4.1 Eﬀects for subsamples
While the private school eﬀect for all students together is not statistically diﬀerent from
zero, it might be the case that certain subgroups of the population proﬁtm o r ef r o m
private schooling than others. E.g. Neal (1997) ﬁnds positive private school eﬀects in
single equation models only for urban students. Thus, we consider subsamples divided by
parental education, family income and urbanicity. Results are reported in Table 4. Full
sample results are repeated in line 1. We ﬁnd that the point estimate for the private school
eﬀect increases up to a certain point for both parental education and income. For the two
highest levels of parental education, the eﬀect is negative, and in the case of students
with parents with a bachelor degree, it is even signiﬁcant. This feature was present in the
descriptive statistics, too. For the third quartile of family income, the private school eﬀect
becomes positive and signiﬁcant, but drops again to almost zero for the highest quartile.
Contrary to Neal’s (1997) results, the point estimate for private schooling is higher for
rural areas than for urban areas, but neither is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
9This last eﬀect is probably due to the fact that we have set the income of self-employed to zero, as
income data for the self-employed is extremely unreliable.The coeﬃcient becomes insigniﬁcant when the
income for the self-employed is set to the mean for employees.
11[Table 4 about here]
4.2 Omitted Variables Bias
In the literature on private school eﬀects, typically, the private school eﬀect in uncorrected
models is signiﬁcant and quantitatively important. Our results, however, report a private
school eﬀect close to zero. There are several possible explanations for these divergent
ﬁndings.
First, we are dealing with Danish data. As mentioned above, the Danish private school
system is quite diﬀerent from the US system, and also, parents’ expectations to a private
school education might be diﬀerent in Denmark. Danish private schools are historically
known as ”free schools”, which means that there is a great degree of freedom with respect
to pedagogies, curriculum etc. The Danish private school sector’s primary characteristic
is diversity, not excellence. Thus, we might not expect to see diﬀerences in educational
outcomes.
Second, our control data set is more comprehensive than the typical set of controls
used for estimation in the private school literature. Thus, the positive private school eﬀect
in single equation models in other studies might be due to omitted variable bias in these
studies. As our data provide more information than the typical data sets used, we can
examine what our results would look like, if we only had the type of information other
studies usually have. In Table 5, we ﬁrst present results of a model with a reduced set of
controls, which is roughly comparable to other studies (e.g. Neal 1997). This basic model
contains data on parental education, student’s age, gender, ethnicity, family structure,
whether there is information on the parents in the register, municipal variables (unem-
ployment, education level), and a dummy for urban areas. In this model with a reduced
set of controls, the private school eﬀect is indeed signiﬁcant, though still quantitatively
unimportant. We then, one by one, add controls. As we see from Table 5, as we add more
controls, the private school coeﬃcient declines steadily and becomes insigniﬁcant in the
end.
[Table 5 about here]
4.3 Heterogenous eﬀects across private school types
As mentioned in section 2, the Danish private school sector is quite diverse. Although
there historically have been diﬀerent types of private schools, generally, these patterns
12have washed out, so using these types will not necessarily ensure that the resulting groups
of private schools are very homogenous. Anyway, we group private schools into nine types
of schools and we add one category for private schools we cannot categorize as belonging
to any of these groups (see Ministry of Education 2000 and Hepburn 1999)10.
• international schools (mainly teaching in English)
• schools with a speciﬁc pedagogical aim: Rudolf Steiner (i.e., Waldorf) schools
• immigrant schools such as Muslim schools
• ”Little schools”: progressive free schools that emphasize group work and individual
responsibility
• ”Free schools”: Grundtvigian schools that are primarily found in rural districts and
emphasize individual growth, oral traditions, and relationships among individuals
• ”Grammar schools” (”realskole”, ”gymnasieskole”): academically rigorous schools
that often emphasize reading, languages, and the sciences in an orderly environment
• German minority schools: established for the German minority in Southern Jutland,
but open to all students (bilingual schools: German/Danish)
• boarding schools
• Christian schools: these are nominally Christian, but usually involve few or no formal
religious practices. They are often characterized by traditional values and a familial
atmosphere
[Figure 2 about here]
We have grouped the schools partly according to their aﬃliation to diﬀerent private
school associations, partly from other information on the schools available on the internet
and also, sometimes the school’s name gives information on the type of school. Some
schools ﬁt into several categories. In these cases, we have then chosen the category we
think is most informative of the type of learning environment, e.g. ”free boarding schools”
have been categorized as boarding schools and ”Christian free schools” as Christian schools
— both types could have been placed under ”free schools” as well. Also, we must drop
the category of immigrant schools, due to sparse data for this type of schools: our data
is for students born from 1965 to 1973 and immigrant schools became popular only in
10The list of schools grouped into each of the following categories is available on request.
13the 1990s, a time when the generations analyzed in our study had ﬁnished compulsory
schooling. Figure 2 shows the distribution of students in our sample over the remaining
types of private schools. By far the most prominent type of private schools are the
academical orientated grammar schools, followed by Christian schools, free schools and
”other” schools, i.e. schools which do not ﬁt into any of the nine speciﬁc types of schools.
[Figure 3 about here]
Also, the geographical distribution of students attending the diﬀerent types of private
schools varies a lot. While international school students almost exclusively live in urban
areas, only about half of all students in free or boarding schools do so. There are no
students in German minority schools living in urban areas, as all schools are located in
Southern Jutland, a rural border region to Germany.
[Figure 4 about here]
When we look at the mean educational outcome of students over the various private
school types, we see from ﬁgure 4 that there is a steady decline from international school
students (who do best), to Rudolf Steiner/Waldorf school students (who do worst). Com-
pared to the mean at public schools (11.8 years of schooling), Rudolf Steiner schools,
little schools and boarding schools are below the public school average, while the other
school types are at or above the public school level. Thus, Figure 4 shows that students
attending diﬀerent types of private schools attain very diﬀerent levels of education. The
question is whether this is due to observable and unobservable diﬀerences in the student
characteristics attending the diﬀerent types of schools, or whether some types of schools
have better technologies for producing human capital measured by years of schooling.
[Figure 5 about here]
Figure 5 presents the point estimates and their 95% conﬁdence intervals from a least
squares estimation of years of schooling on nine private school dummies and the same
set of controls as included in Table 3. Public schools are the reference category. There
are some interesting features: ﬁrst, the point estimates diﬀer a lot across types of schools.
Second, the point estimates for ”other”, grammar, Christian and German minority schools
are positive, the point estimates for the other school types are negative. However, only
four of the point estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero: grammar and Christian
school students attain an amount of schooling that is signiﬁcantly greater that for public
14school students, while both little school students and Rudolf Steiner school students attain
as i g n i ﬁcantly lower level of education.
This little exercise has demonstrated the importance of having a much more com-
prehensive set of controls than is usually available. Also, the more characteristics are
observed, in the nature of things, the fewer characteristics aﬀecting both school choice
and outcomes remain unobserved — and the less problems we run into when trying to
control for bias due to unobserved factors — a procedure which is much more troublesome
and may potentially make the bias worse.
In this section, we have shown results from estimations who control for a host of
observable characteristics. Still, we might worry about bias due to unobservable charac-
teristics. The bias might go in both directions: due to inconveniencies associated with
private schooling (tuition, transport), children who are expected to proﬁt from private
school are more likely to be sent to private school. Also, although private schools gen-
erally are not selective in Denmark, in principle, they decide themselves whom to admit
and whom to keep. If unobservably more able children attend private schools, this will
result in an upward bias of the single equation results. On the other hand, also children
with behavioral problems might be more frequently sent to private schools, which could
bias the OLS results downward. In section 5, we provide results adjusted for the potential
bias due to selection on unobservables.
5 Selectivity corrected models
In our single equation models of section 4, the choice of school type is treated as exogenous.
But in spite of a rich set of controls, there probably remains the empirical problem in
distinguishing a private school eﬀect from unobservable factors that are correlated with
educational attainment. More formally, the results would be biased because the school
type variable in the years of schooling equation would be correlated with the error term.
In this section, we apply IV techniques to control for this type of correlation.
5.1 Model
We reconsider the model of equation (1), but instead of treating the private school dummy
as an exogenous variable, Pij is treated as endogenous and an additional exogenous variable
is used for identiﬁcation. To control for the potential endogeneity between Pij and εij,
Yij is estimated using a treatment model (Maddala 1983). The treatment eﬀects model
estimates the eﬀect of an endogenous binary treatment (private school attendance), Pij,
on a continuous variable, Yij, conditional on the independent variables Xij and Dj.T h e
equation of primary interest is regression function (1), repeated here:
15Yij = β0 + β1Xij + β2Dj + β3Pij + εij (1)
where Pij is now treated as an endogenous dummy variable indicating whether the
treatment is assigned or not. The binary decision to obtain the treatment Pij is modelled
as the outcome of an latent variable, P∗
ij. It is assumed that P∗
ij is a linear function of the
exogenous covariates Xij,D j, and an additional variable — the instrument variable IVij —
(that is excluded from the equation of interest), and a random component uij.S p e c i ﬁcally,
P∗
ij = α0 + α1Xij + α2Dj + α3IVij + uij (2)




ij >0, i.e., the student attends private school
0, otherwise
(3)




. There are many variations of this model in the literature. Maddala (1983)
derives the maximum likelihood estimator of the version implemented here. The error
terms of the school choice equation and the educational attainment equation are correlated
if there are unobserved characteristics, e.g. ability, that are correlated with both the
probability of going to private school and years of schooling attained. The parameters of
the equations are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood.
5.2 Instrument
To correct for potential selection bias, we need to ﬁnd a variable that is closely related to
the probability of attending private school, but which does not directly aﬀect educational
attainment. Most of the existing research on the eﬀect of private schools relies on variables
related to religious aﬃliation as identifying restrictions11. Recently, variation in state laws
reﬂecting the unionization of the public sector (Figlio and Stone 1999), the availability of
public transportation in the MSA (Figlio and Ludwig 2000) and test scores from another
cohort of students at each school (Jepsen forthcoming) have been used to identify private
school choice.
As Catholic or other religious schools do not play an important role in the Danish
context, we cannot use instruments related to religion, as is typically done in the US
11Catholic aﬃliation has been useful in the US context, because a major part of the US private school
sector consists of Catholic schools. Therefore, most US studies are exclusively on Catholic private schools.
16literature12. Instead, inspired by results from the school choice literature which ﬁnds that
what parents really value is their child attending school with similar peers, we exploit
the varying sensitivity with which parents with diﬀerent backgrounds react to the average
public school peer background across municipalities.
The main hypothesis motivating the instrument used in this paper is that demand for
private schooling is a function of how well the environment of the local public school quality
ﬁts the needs of the local service population, because private schools oﬀer additional
options for those unhappy with the public school system. In a residence based public
school system as e.g. the Danish, the location of a family’s residence directly determines
which public school the family’s children are eligible to attend. When dissatisﬁed with
the public oﬀer, some parents move their children from the public to the private schooling
sector13. Thus, low public school quality raises demand for private schools as substitutes
for public schools (Dee 1998).
But: what is it that makes parents unhappy about the local public school? The school
environment is composed of many factors: e.g. teachers, peers, and ﬁnancial resources.
While the empirical evidence of the eﬀects of educational inputs such as per pupil spend-
ing, teacher experience, and teacher educational level have been shown to be relatively
unimportant predictors of outcomes, and the impact of any particular input to be incon-
sistent across studies (see Hanushek 1986, Betts and Morell 1999, Goldhaber and Brewer
1997; Graversen and Heinesen 2002 for Danish results), other analyses provide evidence
of the importance of peers in family’s choice of schooling sector (Lankford and Wyckoﬀ
1992; Lankford, Lee and Wyckoﬀ 1995; Downes and Greenstein 1996; Goldhaber 1996;
West and Palsson 1988; Figlio and Stone 1999). Few privileged families wish their children
to attend schools mainly with children from less privileged backgrounds. Many parents
believe, despite mixed academic evidence on this point, that their child will learn better
alongside other children who are clever than in a mixed-ability setting. Such consider-
ations do not tend to show up directly in surveys when asked for reasons for choosing
schools. Few people like to admit to social or racial prejudice. However, more probing
studies of how parents choose (Ballion 1989; Ball, Bow and Gerwitz 1992) reveal a strong
social element to choice. Peer group diﬀerences are clear: on average, private schools
have students with signiﬁcantly higher than average parental socioeconomic status levels,
w h i c hi sa ni m p o r t a n tp r e d i c t o rf or educational performance.
Following these arguments, we would expect each family’s probability of choosing
private school to be a function of the (average) peer group in the local public school and
12There are nominally Christian schools, but they usually involve few or no formal religious practices.
Rather, they are often characterized by traditional values and a familial atmosphere.
13According to the Education Act, there is free school choice within municipalities in Denmark, but in
practice this choice is quite restricted.
17the student’s own educational ambitions. We expect that the probability of attending
private school increases both as parental education increases and as public school peer
quality falls. But — we expect high educated families to be more sensitive to low peer
quality in public schools than low educated homes. The identifying assumption of our
strategy is that parents with high academic ambitions will be more inclined to choose
a private school when the peer environment at the local public school is perceived to
be low than families with lower ambitions. Therefore, we use the interaction between
mean parental education of local public school peers and the level of education of the
student’s own parents as an instrument14. This identiﬁcation approach exploits the fact
that the diﬀerence in private school attendance rates between high- and low-educated
families should be greater in municipalities with a weaker public school peer background.
To see if this pattern holds in the data, we model the probability of attending private
school as a function of the (average) peer group in the local public school, the student’s
own educational ambitions and the interaction of both. We proxy the quality of the
public school peer group for each municipality by average parental education of public
school students and we proxy the student’s educational ambitions by the educational level
of his own parents. Also, we include the full set of controls as employed in the estimations
reported in Table 3. The probability of private school attendance by average public peer
background (i.e. parental years of schooling) a n do w np a r e n t ’ se d u c a t i o ni sc a l c u l a t e da t
the sample mean (within each group) of the control variables and are shown in graphical
form in Figure 6.
[Figure 6 about here]
As can be seen from Figure 6, a peer group dominated by students from low educated
homes in the local public school is an important factor driving private school attendance
for students from more well-educated homes. When public peer quality rises, private
school attendance of students from high educated families falls. The ﬁgure also shows
that the higher the level of parental education, the more sensitive families are with respect
to public peer group quality. The gap between high and low educated family’s choice of
private school closes as public school peer background peaks at an average of 13 years of
schooling. When public peer background is at its maximum, high educated families are
only marginally more likely to choose private school than are low educated homes. This
14In a recent paper, Altonji, Elder and Taber (2002) propose a similar approach. They argue that
"tastes" for (Catholic) private schooling depend strongly on religious preference and they suggest that the
interaction between the availability of Catholic schools and religious aﬃliation will have an eﬀect on school
attendance that is independent of the separate eﬀects of religious aﬃliation and distance. However, when
they explore the validity of their instrument, they conclude that it is not a useful source of identiﬁcation
of the Catholic private school eﬀect.
18result is useful, because while there may be many diﬀerent reasons for choosing private
school (individual taste for special curricula, pedagogical methods etc.), the sensitivity
to the quality of public school peers can be treated as exogenous variation. In the IV
regression, we include both the interaction of the mean public school peer background
in the municipality and own parental education and the main eﬀects. However, we only
use the interaction as an instrument (which is excluded from the outcome regression)
and we can therefore use the main eﬀects as controls in both the school choice and the
educational outcome equation. What we use for identiﬁcation is not the level of own
parental education and of the public school environment, but only the diﬀerence in the
sensitivity with which parents with diﬀerent educational background react to variations
in the peer group environment at local public schools. More formally, consider rewriting
equations 1 and 2:
Yij = β0 + β1a (PA_EDij)+β1b(PE_ENVj)
+β1d e Xij + β2 e Dj + β3P∗
ij + εij (4)
P∗
ij = α0 + α1a (PA_EDij)+α1b(PE_ENVj)+α1c (PA_EDij) · (PE_ENVj)
+α1d e Xij + α2 e Dj + uij (5)
where PA_EDij (parental education) is the educational background of the students
own parents, PE_ENVj (peer environment) is the average parental education of public
school students in municipality j and e Xij and e Dj are the remaining controls from equations
1 and 2. As shown in the equations above, the interaction term is included in the school
choice equation only, while the main eﬀects are controlled for in both the choice and the
outcome equation.
The strength of the identiﬁcation approach is that we only need to exclude the in-
teraction from the outcome equation, while being able to control for both own parental
education and the peer environment in the years of schooling equation. One of the short-
comings of the identiﬁcation strategy is that it is not possible to test formally whether the
interaction of parental education and public school peer background is a valid instrument
in this just-identiﬁed model. Instead, we must argue for validity and we also provide an
informal test of validity, see section 5.4. In our identiﬁcation strategy, we assume implic-
itly that residential choice is exogenous. However, we actually only need a less restrictive
assumption. If we are willing to assume, that otherwise similar parents, no matter which
municipality they live in, are equally concerned about their children’s education, then it
seems unlikely that the diﬀerence in educational outcomes between students with strong
and weak parental background should vary systematically with the local public school
19environment after conditioning on the school sector attended. This means that parents,
who are dissatisﬁed with the peer environment of their local public school, react by send-
ing their children to an appropriate private school — hereby ensuring a proper learning
environment for their children. Due to a generally low tuition level and additional tuition
reduction for low income families, this is a feasible strategy for most families. Also, at
least in the long run, there should be no constraint on the supply of private schooling,
due to the low barriers for setting up new private schools and publicly provided vouchers
for each private school student. We provide further evidence for the validity and strength
of the instrument in section 5.4.
The empirical analysis will focus on urban municipalities, i.e. municipalities belonging
to the metropolitan areas of the three biggest cities (Copenhagen, Århus and Odense)
and other big cities — all in all 85 out of 264 municipalities. This is due to the fact that
our instrument (the interaction of parental education and public school peer background)
is not a strong predictor of private school choice in rural areas. Also, the data suggest
that the motivation for choosing between public and private school may diﬀer in rural
and urban areas: overall, private school students have more educated parents — however,
the diﬀerence between the parents’ educational background of private and public school
students is greatest in urban areas. In rural areas, the average parent of private school
students has 0.7 more years of schooling than the average public school parent, in contrast
t oad i ﬀerence of 1.1 years in urban areas, indicating stronger selection by socioeconomic
background in urban areas. The restricted data set comprises 68% of all private school
students and 59% of public school students. We are aware of the fact that this limits the
validity of the IV-results which is hereby restricted to the subsample of urban municipal-
ities.
5.3 Results
The results from the years of schooling equation from the treatment model are reported
in Table 6 and the results from the school choice equation are reported in Table A1 in the
appendix. The equations are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood. We have
used the same set of controls as in Table 3 for the single equation model. For comparison:
the private school eﬀect from the single equation model for the urban subsample is .029
and is not signiﬁcant (results not shown), a results which is close to the full sample eﬀect
of .024.
[Table 6 about here]
20The private school coeﬃcient from the corrected model is negative, but remains in-
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Also, the treatment model approach triples the size of
the standard deviation of the private school coeﬃcient, which undermines the accuracy
of the results. However, even with a standard error of a size similar to the one from the
uncorrected model, the private school coeﬃcient estimated by IV methods would still be
insigniﬁcant. We note that our single equation estimate was biased upwards. We conclude
that taking account of potential bias due to unobservables, reduces the private school ef-
fect, but does not alter the conclusion that the private school eﬀect is not statistically
diﬀerent from zero. Also, a likelihood-ratio test indicates that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the error terms of the two equations are uncorrelated.
However, only if we are willing to make the assumption that there is a homogenous
treatment eﬀect, i.e. that the treatment eﬀect is the same for every student, are the
OLS and the IV results deﬁned for the same subgroup of students. If treatment eﬀects are
heterogenous, then the IV procedure identiﬁes the eﬀects of the private school ”treatment”
only for those students who are induced to switch school sectors by variation in the
instruments (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Thus, the private school eﬀect for families who
would choose private school no matter what learning environment their public school
oﬀers, e.g. due to a preference for a special pedagogical approach or a special curriculum
ap r i v a t es c h o o lo ﬀers, is not identiﬁed. Neither is the private school eﬀect identiﬁed
for families who would never consider choosing a private school at all. Thus, we must
bear in mind, that if treatment eﬀects are heterogenous, our OLS and IV results are
not fully comparable, as the treatment eﬀects are identiﬁed for diﬀerent (sub-) groups.
Therefore, the drop of the point estimate from .029 to -.108 might not exclusively be due
to positive selection, but can also be a result of the fact that the private school eﬀect
for the subgroup which is responsive to the instrument, is smaller or even negative. The
sign and magnitude of the control variables are quite similar to OLS results for the urban
subsample (not reported).
5.4 Instrument validity
Next, we provide some evidence of the validity of the instrument. Results from the school
choice probit model are shown in Table A1 in the appendix. As expected, the instrument,
i.e. the interaction between parental education and public school peer background, is
negative and is a signiﬁcant predictor of school choice. Thus, for a given parental edu-
cation, as public school peer background in the municipality decreases, the probability of
attending private school rises, and it rises faster the higher the own parental education
background. The instrument has signiﬁcant explanatory power in the ﬁrst-stage regres-
sion (for the decision to attend private rather than public school) — which is a crucial
21characteristic of a good instrument as shown by Staiger and Stock (1997). The hypothesis
that the estimated coeﬃcient on the instrument is equal to zero is strongly rejected at the
0.01% level.
It was easy to verify that the instrument is a signiﬁcant predictor of school choice.
Now, the credibility of the instrument variable results turns on the assumption that the
educational outcome of students from families who are more or less sensitive to public
peer quality is not diﬀerent once the school sector chosen is controlled for. Unfortunately,
we cannot formally test this in a just-identiﬁed model.
However, a simple regression of years of schooling on the instrument and the type of
school attended — without the inclusion of further controls other than the main eﬀects
of the instrument (parental education, public school peer background) suggests that the
number of years of schooling attained does not turn on his/her parents’ sensitivity to the
quality of the local public school. The estimated coeﬃcient is negative, but insigniﬁcant
with a p-value of .17. Moreover, when adjustments are made for background variables and
type of school attended, the instrument turns even more insigniﬁcant with a p-value as
high as .43. Although this is not a direct test of whether our instrument is valid, it does
indicate that, as a group, otherwise similar families who choose to live in municipalities
with dissimilar public school peers are no diﬀerent (with respect to unobservables that
might inﬂuence outcomes) from those living in municipalities with similar public school
peers.
Intuitively, what can explain the validity of the instrument variable? We oﬀer the
following conjecture. Basically, our hypothesis is that there is a tendency that students
will sort into similar peer groups. Either, they sort by residential location, thereby form-
ing groups that are relatively homogeneous in terms of their preferences with regard to
schooling. In these municipalities, public schools can be targeted to this group. Or, when
living in a municipality, where the public school learning environment is dominated by a
student-body with preferences diﬀerent from one’s own, students sort across public and
private schools, hereby achieving a similar degree of homogeneity of their school peers.
In this paper, as in most of the existing empirical literature, we assume that we can
treat the location decision of the household as exogenous, i.e. parents choosing to live in
a municipality where their own preferences to education coincide with the learning envi-
ronment of the local public school are not unobservably diﬀerent (with respect to charac-
teristics aﬀecting educational outcome) from parents who choose to live in a municipality
where their own preferences to education do not match with the learning environment of
the local public school. We can argue that this is so because parents, no matter where
they live, seek a good peer group ﬁt for their child. Whether they ﬁnd the adequate peer
group within the private or public school sector depends on the type of municipality they
22live in15. Thus, in this setting private school choice is merely a sorting device. Once
students have been selected into their individually adequate type of school (private or
public), i.e. the type that matches their peer group, there is no eﬀect of the public school
peer composition on educational attainment.
The hypothesis is conﬁrmed by the ﬁnding of Lankford and Wyckoﬀ (2000), who ﬁnd
that students are equally segregated by school in metropolitan areas with greater and lesser
degrees of school choice among districts. They argue that the degree of inter-district school
choice does aﬀect the way households are sorted across districts, but that the resulting
sorting appears to have little eﬀect on the average level of achievement. This may be so,
because students may already be self-sorted into peer groups across schools (within the
district). Therefore, greater inter-district choice will not alter the peer pattern and thus
achievement. Also, Lankford and Wyckoﬀ show that when inner-city schools in the US
were desegregated (for example by busing), whites began to move from the urban to the
white suburban areas. This underlines the strength of peer sorting: when peer matching
across schools within the district is disrupted by desegregation (or other) policies, people
will to a greater extent sort by residential location and they thereby re-establish the former
peer group patterns in new locations.
The intuitive explanation for the validity of the instrument, conﬁrmed by the results
from (informal) testing, is that because students will always be sorted by peer groups
(either by location or by type of school), the disparity between the public school environ-
ment and own ambitions does not inﬂuence student performance, except for a potential
private school eﬀect.
5.5 More results
Finally, we explore the sensitivity of our results to changes in the speciﬁcation of our
model.
5.5.1 Heterogenous eﬀects across parental income quartiles As for the uncor-
rected results, we suggest that a private school eﬀect might diﬀer by students parental
background. However, we cannot estimate for separate samples by parental education
as in section 4, as this variable is part of the instrument. Also, as the IV procedure is
e s t i m a t e do nt h eu r b a ns a m p l eo n l y ,w ec a n n o tl o o ka te ﬀects that diﬀer by urban and
rural students, neither. What remains is to analyze the private school eﬀect for income
quartiles. We divide the sample from the IV estimation in section 5.3 by income quartiles
15There is suggestive evidence on this; e.g. in inner-city Copenhagen (with low average peer background
at public schools), one out of two students from high-educated families is attending private school, while
this, for example, is only the case for one out of ﬁve students in the well-oﬀ suburb of Gentofte.
23and estimate the eﬀect of attending private school. Results are reported Table 7. We
also computed single equation results as reported in Table 4, but for comparison only
for the urban subsample. The results for the uncorrected model are reported in column
1. For all income quartiles the point estimates are reduced compared to the uncorrected
results. The coeﬃcient for the third quartile that is signiﬁcant in uncorrected models,
is insigniﬁcant under IV. This is not solely due to the inﬂated standard errors induced
by the IV procedure — even with a standard error of a size similar to the one from the
uncorrected model, the private school coeﬃcient for the third income quartile would still
be insigniﬁcant.
[Table 7 about here]
5.5.2 Heterogenous eﬀects across private school types — IV We estimate selec-
tivity corrected models for the nine diﬀerent private school types as presented in section
4.3. Instead of modelling school choice between public school and the nine types of private
schools explicitely, we adopt the common approach in this literature of dropping students
from private schools other than the type analyzed from the sample, which gives us sev-
eral models — each estimating the eﬀect of the single private school type compared to
public schools. However, the private school sector is composed of many diﬀerent school
types, leaving only few observations within each category. The restriction of our sam-
ple to urban students when we estimate by instrumental variables methods reduces the
subsamples even further. In that way limited by the data, we choose to only estimate
the eﬀect for the four larger private school types — grammar schools, Christian schools,
the category of ”other private schools” and free schools. Table 8 reports the (corrected)
results from the IV regressions and uncorrected results from an OLS regression for the
same four subsamples16.
[Table 8 about here]
Comparing the corrected and uncorrected results, we ﬁnd that the point estimates of
the corrected models are all much smaller than for the uncorrected model (even turning
negative for ”other private schools” and free schools), thus indicating an upward bias in
the OLS results. The statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect from grammar schools thus
vanishes once we control for selection on unobservables. The coeﬃcients on Christian,
16These OLS results diﬀer from the OLS results reported earlier, as they are estimated on the urban
subsample alone.
24”other” and free private schools remain insigniﬁcant, but are smaller in size17. As before,
the standard errors are inﬂated by the IV procedure. However, even with a standard error
of a size similar to the one from the uncorrected model, the IV coeﬃcients on Christian,
”other” and free private schools would remain insigniﬁcant.
6 Reservations and extensions
Our research leaves open a number of questions. First, in this paper, we do not model
residential choice. This is a short-coming as families with school-aged children probably
make decisions of school choice and where to live simultaneously. Modelling residential
choice as well demands a more extensive data set than is commonly available for school
eﬀects studies. However, in a more recent study of the school choice literature, Lankford
and Wyckoﬀ (2000) model residential choice and school choice jointly. Second, we have
only information on the municipality of residence, not on the school district. Thus, we
cannot model the choice between the actual local public school and a range of private
schools explicitly. This may be a problem in big municipalities with quite heterogenous
neighborhoods — for example the inner-city of Copenhagen. Third, ideally, we would
estimate the IV version of the model for diﬀerent private school eﬀects for all schools in
one estimation. In the ﬁrst step, we would model the choice between public school and
the nine types of private schools. In the next step we would correct for selection into
diﬀerent types of private schools when estimating the eﬀect of the school types attended
on educational attainment. Alternatively, we would model the ﬁrst step school choice
decision as a nested choice assuming that families choose whether or not to attend public
school ﬁrst and those preferring a private school do then choose among nine diﬀerent types
of schools. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
7 Conclusion and outlook
In this paper, we analyzed the eﬀect of attending private school on educational attainment.
In sum, the results do not indicate that private schools are either better or worse than
public schools in general. The ”uncorrected” estimate is positive for the private school
sector as a whole, but small and not statistically signiﬁcant from zero. After adjusting
for selection on unobservables into private schools, the private school coeﬃcient turns
negative, but is still small and insigniﬁcant.
Comparing our results to the international literature, we ﬁnd that our single equation
results are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, while the result in other studies typically
17Note that the OLS coeﬃcient on Christian private schools is only just signiﬁcant in the full sample,
and turns insigniﬁcant in the sample restricted to urban areas.
25are positive. However, our set of controls is more extensive than is usual in private
school studies. When we imitate the reduced set of controls common to other studies in
the literature, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive private school eﬀect, too. The additional
controls which have the greatest downward impact on the private school coeﬃcient, are
dummies for parents’ labor market status and the number of rooms per person in the
family’s home.
As an additional step, we form more homogenous private school groups, as the Danish
private school sector is quite heterogenous. Single equation results of these private school
eﬀects indicate that some types of schools do better than public schools, some do worse,
while others are at the same level. Due to data limitations, we cannot estimate selectivity-
adjusted eﬀects for all private school types. However, for grammar schools, Christian
schools, ”other schools” and free schools, we ﬁnd that after adjusting for selection on
unobservable characteristics, the point estimates are reduced and insigniﬁcant. Our results
suggest that in our sample the positive private school eﬀects found in the single-equation
model can be attributed to the choices families make: students whose parents choose
these speciﬁc types of private schools attain — on average — more years of schooling than
we would have expected given their observed characteristics.
All in all, we found (i) a zero private school eﬀect for the Danish private schools as a
whole and for the four most important types of private schools and (ii) that the omission
of additional variables controlling for parental background (not commonly included in
analyses of private school eﬀects) may be of crucial importance for the results.
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29AppendixTable A1: School choice equation
Independent variable School choice
Coeﬃcient Std.err.






NUMBER_SIBL .087 .020 ∗∗








TEEN_MUM -.146 .041 ∗∗
TEEN_DAD -.067 .070
PAR_EDUC .312 .076 ∗∗
MUM_EARNER (reference category)
MUM_SELFEMPL .265 .046 ∗∗
MUM_STUD .565 .107 ∗∗
MUM_SOCASS .195 .104
MUM_NOTWORK .107 .042 ∗
DAD_EARNER (reference category)
DAD_SELFEMPL .395 .038 ∗∗
DAD_STUD .394 .213
DAD_SOCASS .250 .149
DAD_NOTWORK .305 .055 ∗
MUM_INCOME .006 .001 ∗∗
DAD_INCOME .005 .001 ∗∗








ROOMS .246 .028 ∗∗
ROOMS_UNKNOWN .376 .167 ∗
DEPRIVED -.184 .057 ∗∗
MUN_BI 4.973 4.394 ∗∗







MUN_COLL 2.176 6.496 ∗∗
Public school peer background .130 .101
Constant -5.039 1.153 ∗∗
Year of birth dummies yes
NOREC_MUM/DAD yes
Interaction terms:
income*child lives with parent yes
wealth*child lives with parent yes
unempl.*child lives with parent yes
Number of observations 33100
ρ .033 (.037)
LR test of indep. eqns (ρ =0 ): χ2 (1) = 0.75
∗ and ∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance above the .05 and .01 level,
respectively.
32Table 1: Selected descriptive statistics
Variable Mean
Public Private
Number of observations 50,202 4,792
Personal characteristics
FEMALE 0-1 dummy, =1 if student is female .49 .49
DANISH 0-1 dummy, =1 if student is of Danish/Western origin .97 .96
IMMIGRANT 0-1 dummy, =1 if student is an immigrant .03 .04
SECIMMIGRANT 0-1 dummy, =1 if student is second generation immigrant <.00 <.00
Family background
NUMBER_SIBL Number of siblings under 18 years .76 .72 ∗∗
YOUNG_SIBL 0-1 dummy, =1 if student has younger siblings .50 .47 ∗∗
LIVE_BOTH 0-1 dummy, =1 if student lives with both parents .80 .75 ∗∗
LIVE_SINGLEMUM 0-1 dummy, =1 if student lives with single mother .10 .14 ∗∗
LIVE_MUMSTEPD 0-1 dummy, =1 if student lives with mother and stepf. .06 .07
LIVE_SINGLEDAD 0-1 dummy, =1 if student lives with single father .02 .02 ∗
LIVE_DADSTEPM 0-1 dummy, =1 if student lives with father and stepm. .01 .01
LIVE_NOPAR 0-1 dummy, =1 if student not live with either parent .01 .01
LIVE_NOPARTOG 0-1 dummy, =1 if student does not live with parents, <.00 <.00
but parents live together
NOREC_MUM 0-1 dummy, =1 if no record of stud.’s mother in register <.00 <.00
NOREC_DAD 0-1 dummy, =1 if no record of student’s father in register .03 .05 ∗∗
TEEN_MUM 0-1 dummy, =1 if mother was a teen at student’s birth .11 .07 ∗∗
TEEN_DAD 0-1 dummy, =1 if father was a teen at student’s birth .03 .02 ∗∗
PAR_EDUC Years of schooling for the parent with highest education 11.52 12.61 ∗∗
MUM_EARNER 0-1 dummy, =1 if mother is wage earner .75 .74
MUM_SELFEMPL 0-1 dummy, =1 if mother is self-employed .11 .14 ∗∗
MUM_STUD 0-1 dummy, =1 if mother is in formal education/training <.00 .01 ∗∗
MUM_SOCASS 0-1 dummy, =1 if mother receives social assistance .01 .01
MUM_NOTWORK 0-1 dummy, =1 if mother not active in the labor market .12 .10 ∗∗
DAD_EARNER 0-1 dummy, =1 if father is wage earner .73 .67 ∗∗
DAD_SELFEMPL 0-1 dummy, =1 if father is self-employed .19 .23 ∗∗
DAD_STUD 0-1 dummy, =1 if father is in formal education/training <.00 <.00 ∗
DAD_SOCASS 0-1 dummy, =1 if father receives social assistance <.00 <.00
DAD_NOTWORK 0-1 dummy, =1 if father not active in the labor market .04 .04
MUM_INCOME Mother’s labor income (in 10,000 DKK) 12.72 14.40 ∗∗
DAD_INCOME Father’s labor income (in 10,000 DKK) 21.87 24.13 ∗∗
MUM_UNEMPL 0-1, mother’s degree of unemployment .06 .05 ∗∗
DAD_UNEMPL 0-1, father’s degree of unemployment .04 .03 ∗∗
MUM_WEALTH Mother’s ﬁnancial wealth (in 100,000 DKK) .39 .84 ∗∗
DAD_WEALTH Father’s ﬁnancial wealth (in 100,000 DKK) 3.00 3.61 ∗∗
DW_OWN Lives in owner-occupied dwelling .75 .76
DW_RENT Lives in rented dwelling .21 .19 ∗∗
DW_NOCAT Lives in not-categorized dwelling .02 .03 ∗∗
DW_UNKNOWN Type of dwelling unknown .01 .01
R O O M S N u m b e ro fr o o m sp e rp e r s o n 1 . 2 1 1 . 3 3 ∗∗
ROOMS_UNKNOWN Number of rooms per person unknown .01 .01





Socioeconomic conditions in the school municipality
MUN_BI Proportion of bilingual children .01 .02 ∗∗
MUN_UNEMPL 0-1, average degree of unemployment .09 .09
MUN_COMP 0-1, share of adults with compulsory education .56 .55 ∗∗
MUN_VOC 0-1, share of adults with a vocational degree .31 .31 ∗
MUN_COLL 0-1, share of adults with college/univ. degree .13 .14 ∗∗
URBAN 0-1 dummy, =1 if student lives in urban area .59 .68 ∗∗
Outcome
Years of schooling 11.77 12.15 ∗∗
∗ and ∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the .05 and .01 level, from a test of identical means
in the private and public school sample.
34Table 2: Educational outcomes by school type
Years of schooling
Sample Public schools Private schools
Full sample 11.8 12.2 ∗∗
Parent unskilled 11.0 11.1 ∗∗
Parent skilled 11.6 11.7 ∗
Parent high-school degree 12.3 12.6 ∗
Parent short college 12.3 12.4 ∗
Parent long college 13.1 12.7 ∗∗
Parent university 13.7 13.5 ∗
Family income less than 25th percentile 11.5 11.8 ∗∗
Family income between 25th and 50th percentile 11.5 11.7 ∗∗
Family income between 50th and 75th percentile 11.7 12.0 ∗∗
Family income over 75th percentile 12.5 12.7 ∗∗
Rural areas 11.7 12.0 ∗∗
Urban areas 11.8 12.2 ∗∗
(Data is unadjusted: raw means)
∗ and ∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the .05 and .01 level, from a test of identical means
in the private and public school sample.
35Table 3: Uncorrected results; selected variables
Independent variable Years of schooling
Coeﬃcient Std.err.
Private School .024 .034
MALE (reference category)





YOUNG_SIBL .212 .028 ∗∗
LIVE_BOTH (reference category)
LIVE_SINGLEMUM -.318 .052 ∗∗
LIVE_MUMSTEPD -.384 .053 ∗∗
LIVE_SINGLEDAD -.547 .092 ∗∗
LIVE_DADSTEPM -.527 .106 ∗∗
LIVE_NOPAR -.729 .107 ∗∗
LIVE_NOPARTOG .018 .166
TEEN_MUM -.334 .029 ∗∗
TEEN_DAD -.133 .051 ∗∗
PAR_EDUC .266 .005 ∗∗
MUM_EARNER (reference category)
MUM_SELFEMPL .062 .042
MUM_STUD .389 .149 ∗∗
MUM_SOCASS -.420 .080 ∗∗
MUM_NOTWORK -.143 .037 ∗∗
DAD_EARNER (reference category)
DAD_SELFEMPL .318 .040 ∗∗
DAD_STUD .235 .272
DAD_SOCASS -.230 .119 ∗
DAD_NOTWORK .107 .051 ∗
MUM_INCOME .005 .002 ∗∗
DAD_INCOME .010 .001 ∗∗
MUM_UNEMPL -.497 .056 ∗∗
DAD_UNEMPL -.559 .077 ∗∗
MUM_WEALTH .003 .002
DAD_WEALTH .004 .001 ∗∗
DW_OWN (reference category)
DW_RENT -.336 .026 ∗∗
DW_NOCAT -.111 .072
DW_UNKNOWN -.373 .110 ∗∗
ROOMS .401 .024 ∗∗
ROOMS_UNKNOWN .463 .138 ∗∗
DEPRIVED -.183 .048 ∗∗








MUN_COLL 1.131 .255 ∗∗
URBAN -.037 .027
Constant 7.424 .140 ∗∗
Year of birth dummies yes
NOREC_MUM/DAD yes
Interaction terms:
income*child lives with parent yes
wealth*child lives with parent yes
unempl.*child lives with parent yes
Number of observations 54994
R2 0.172
∗ and ∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance above the .05 and .01 level,
respectively.
37Table 4: Subsample results (single equation)
Private school eﬀect
Sample Coeﬃcient Std.err. Obs.
Full sample .023 .049 54923
Parent unskilled .049 .079 14469
Parent skilled .086 .050 25787
Parent high-school degree .182 .243 791
Parent short college .220 .104 4881
Parent long college -.328 .095 ∗∗ 5595
Parent university -.001 .106 3400
Family income less than 25th percentile -.069 .065 13717
Family income between 25th and 50th percentile .061 .070 13730
Family income between 50th and 75th percentile .157 .079 ∗ 13757
Family income over 75th percentile .009 .062 13719
Rural areas .055 .058 21876
Urban areas .019 .042 33047
∗ and ∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance above the .05 and .01 level, respectively.
All controls included.
38Table 5
Model Additional exogenous variables Private school eﬀect
Coeﬀ.S t d . d e v .
(1) Basic model .118 .034 ∗∗
(2) + Parental labor income .103 .034 ∗∗
(3) + Parental unemployment .102 .034 ∗∗
(4) + Siblings .102 .034 ∗∗
(5) + Teenmum/-dad .094 .034 ∗∗
(6) + Labor market status .054 .034
(7) + Parental wealth .053 .034
(8) + Type of dwelling .052 .034
(9) + Number of rooms p.p. .026 .034
(10) + Living in socially deprived area .024 .034
(11) + Share of bilingual stud. in munic. .032 .034
∗ and ∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance above the .05 and .01 level, respectively.
Controls included in all models: parental education, student’s age, gender,
ethnicity, family structure, whether there is information on the parents in
the register, municipal variables (unemployment, education level), and a
dummy for urban areas.
39Table 6: Instrument variable estimates
Independent variable Years of schooling
Coeﬃcient Std.err.
Private School -.108 .147
MALE (reference category)




NUMBER_SIBL -.047 .024 ∗
YOUNG_SIBL .253 .037 ∗∗
LIVE_BOTH (reference category)
LIVE_SINGLEMUM -.364 .064 ∗∗
LIVE_MUMSTEPD -.345 .068 ∗∗
LIVE_SINGLEDAD -.470 .124 ∗∗
LIVE_DADSTEPM -.509 .143 ∗∗
LIVE_NOPAR -.765 .143 ∗∗
LIVE_NOPARTOG .024 .215
TEEN_MUM -.366 .041 ∗∗
TEEN_DAD -.145 .068 ∗
PAR_EDUC .262 .006 ∗∗
MUM_EARNER (reference category)
MUM_SELFEMPL .021 .057
MUM_STUD .308 .154 ∗
MUM_SOCASS -.352 .110 ∗∗
MUM_NOTWORK -.098 .048 ∗
DAD_EARNER (reference category)
DAD_SELFEMPL .292 .049 ∗∗
DAD_STUD .202 .293
DAD_SOCASS -.216 .167
DAD_NOTWORK .157 .067 ∗
MUM_INCOME .007 .002 ∗∗
DAD_INCOME .010 .001 ∗∗
MUM_UNEMPL -.417 .079 ∗∗
DAD_UNEMPL -.348 .110 ∗∗
MUM_WEALTH .006 .002 ∗∗
DAD_WEALTH .006 .001 ∗∗
DW_OWN (reference category)
DW_RENT -.365 .032 ∗∗
DW_NOCAT -.164 .072 ∗∗
DW_UNKNOWN -.555 .156 ∗∗
ROOMS .355 .033 ∗∗
ROOMS_UNKNOWN .490 .201 ∗





Variable Years of schooling
Coeﬃcient Std.err.
MUN_COMP (reference category)
MUN_VOC -2.200 .415 ∗∗
MUN_COLL -3.523 .676 ∗∗
Public school peer background .397 .058 ∗∗
Constant 4.363 .588 ∗∗
Year of birth dummies yes
NOREC_MUM/DAD yes
Interaction terms:
income*child lives with parent yes
wealth*child lives with parent yes
unempl.*child lives with parent yes
Number of observations 33100
ρ .032 (.036)
LR test of indep. eqns (ρ =0 ): Prob>χ2 =0 .39




1. quartile -.069 (.065) -.145 (.303)
2. quartile .061 (.070) -.060 (.344)
3. quartile .157 (.079) ∗ .068 (.313)
4. quartile .009 (.062) -.111 (.327)
∗ indicates signiﬁc a n c ea b o v et h e. 0 5l e v e l ,
respectively. All controls included. Standard
errors in parantheses. ♦Only urban subsample
Table 8
Uncorrected♦ Corrected No. of obs.
Grammar schools .166 (.060) ∗∗ .070 (.197) 1415
Christian schools .168 (.100) .082 (.402) 477
Other private schools .082 (.098) -.146 (.257) 555
Free schools <.000 (.121) -.136 (.554) 307
∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance above the .01 level. All controls included.

























Figure 1: Years of schooling attained for public and private school students










Figure 2: Distribution of private school students by school type
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Figure 6: Private school attendance by peer environment in the local public school
45